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Purposes
 To assess the effects of the EU-MED 
agreements on the respect of democratic 
principles and the promotion of “good 
governance” 
 To investigate the timing of these effects   3
Motivations
 A recent trend in North South preferential 
agreements: non-trade conditionality;
 Particularly true for the EU:
 since the beginning of the 90’s the EU has included in 
all its trade agreements provisions connected with the 
respect of democratic principles and the promotion of 






 Particularity of EU-MED agreements:
 Mainly autocratic countries
Has the “political conditionality” imposed by the EU 
been strong enough to allow people to enjoy more 
liberties? 
 No « obligation to achieve a result »
Has EU-MED agreements contributed to improving the 
quality of the institutions of Mediterranean countries?   5
Governance measures
 Two indicators of democracy:
 Polity IV
 Freedom House: political rights and civil liberties
 Governance indicators: IRCG
 Quality of bureaucracy
 Corruption 
 Law and order
An overall governance indicator  6
The overall impact of EU-MED 
agreements
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•Yit is governance in country i at time t, 
•ai is a time-invariant effect unique to individual i 
•Tt is time effect common to all countries at time t, 
•Xit is a set of other control variables, 
•Euromedit is a binary Euro-Med membership indicator, it takes the 
value of 1 from the year the agreement was signed and 0 otherwise 
•eit is an unobserved error term   7
The timing in the effects
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•yit, ai, Tt, xit, eit are defined in the same way as in equation 
(1) ;
•Euromed(-2)it is a dummy variable that takes the value of 
one the two years before the agreement was signed, and 
zero otherwise;
•Euromed13it equals to one the year when the agreement 
was signed and the two following years;
•Euromed>=4 it equals to 1 from the 4th year after the 
agreement was signed.  8
Two estimations techniques
 Within comparisons: only use the time 
variation in the data. It consists in 
estimating equation (1) and (2) on a sample 
made only with countries  that have signed 
an agreement.
 Difference-in-differences estimations (DID): 
consist in identifying a specific intervention 
or treatment. One then compare the 
difference in a dependent variable before 
and after the intervention for groups 
affected by the treatment to the same 
difference for unaffected groups.  9
Effects on democracy using Within Comparisons
Polity 020 FH
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Euromed  -0,24 0,37 _ _ -0,32 -0,53** _ _
Euromed(-2) _ _ 0,16 0,52 _ _ -0,32* -0,53*
Euromed13 _ _ 0,03 0,67 _ _ -0,42 -0,72***
Euromed>= 4 _ _ 0,61 1,92* _ _ -0,38 -1,01**
Ln(GDP/capita) _ -7,75*** _ -9,21*** _ 1,91* _ 1,83**
% Fuel exports _ -0,02 _ -0,01 _ -0,01* _ -0,02***
Trade Openness _ 0,07** _ 0,04* _ -0,01 _ -0,01*
Number of observations 114 110 133 124 108 105 126 118
R² 0,94 0,97 0,94 0,97 0,87 0,90 0,90 0,92
Time specific effects 3,97 14,64 1,61 8,43 6,41 9,44 1,55 3,32
Prob>F 0,00 0,00 0,15 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,17 0,01  10
Effects on democracy using DID
Polity020
1 2 3 4 5 6
Euromed -1,38** -1,28 -0,89 _ _ _
Euromedmoins2 _ _ _ -1,53* -1,24 -1,67
Euromed13 _ _ _ -1,55* -1,44 -1,17
Euromed>=4 _ _ _ -1,82*** -1,63 -1,45
Ln(PIB/hab) _ _ -1,10 _ _ -1,02
%Exportations
Pétrolières
_ _ 0,02 _ _ 0,02
Ouverture
Commerciale
_ _ 0,01 _ _ 0,01
Y*CONST NON OUI OUI NON OUI OUI
Nbre Observations 2428,00 2428,00 1258,00 2428,00 2428,00 1258,00
R-squared 0,79 0,82 0,86 0,79 0,82 0,86
Effets Spécifiques
Temps
6,29 1,81 13,89 6,26 1,80 2,60
Prob>F 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,00  11
Effects on democracy using DID
  FH
1 2 3 4 5 6
Euromed 0,52*** 0,37 0,35 _ _ _
Euromed(-2) _ _ _ 0,44** 0,39 0,44
Euromed13 _ _ _ 0,53*** 0,38 0,38
Euromed>=4 _ _ _ 0,74*** 0,57 0,58
Ln(PIB/hab) _ _ -0,33 _ _ -0,35
%fuel exports _ _ -0,01* _ _ -0,01*
Trade openness _ _ 0,00 _ _ 0,00
Y*CONST NO  YES YES NO  YES NO
Number observations 2321,00 2321,00 1198,00 2321,00 2321,00 1198,00
R² 0,78 0,81 0,84 0,78 0,81 0,84
Time specific effects 4,20 4,40 31,00 4,07 3,52 30,09
Prob>F 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00  12
Impact on overall governance using within 
comparisons
Overall governance
1 2 3 4
Euromed  0,35 0,48** _ _
Euromed(-2) _ _ 0,06 0,11
Euromed13 _ _ 0,06 0,38
Euromed>= 4 _ _ 0,42 0,52
Ln(GDP/capita) _ 1,24 _ 1,75
% Fuel exports _ 0,01 _ 0,02*
Trade Openness _ 0,01 _ 0,01**
Number of observations 120 110 140 124
R² 0,82 0,84 0,81 0,86
Time specific effects 4,88 13,73 40,28 4,48
Prob>F 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00  13





1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Euromed  0,34 _ -0,05 _ 0,80* 0,97** _ _
Euromed(-2) _ -0,51 _ 0,19 _ _ 0,38 0,43
Euromed13 _ -0,43 _ 0,15 _ _ 0,39 0,97*
Euromed>= 4 _ -0,32 _ 0,28 _ _ 1,15 1,38*
Ln(GDP/capita) _ _ _ _ _ 2,37* _ 2,15
% Fuel exports _ _ _ _ _ 0,02 _ 0,02*
Trade Openness _ _ _ _ _ 0,02* _ 0,02***
Number of 
observations
120,00 140,00 120,00 140,00 120,00 110,00 140,00 124,00
R² 0,68 0,63 0,75 0,76 0,81 0,85 0,82 0,86
Time specific effects 6,14 4,50 13,78 6,06 4,28 11,12 12,30 9,38
Prob>F 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00  14
Impact on governance as a whole using DID
1 2 3 4 5 6
Euromed 0,36** 0,42* 0,52** _ _ _
Euromed(-2) _ _ _ 0,28* 0,33** 0,36***
Euromed13 _ _ _ 0,29* 0,38* 0,48**
Euromed>=4 _ _ _ 0,58*** 0,64** 0,82**
Ln(PIB/hab) _ _ 0,56 _ _ 0,53
%fuel exports _ _ 0,00 _ _ 0,00
Trade openness _ _ 0,00 _ _ 0,00
Y*CONST NO  YES YES NO  YES NO
Number 
observations
1994,00 1994,00 1128,00 1994,00 1994,00 1128,00
R² 0,74 0,78 0,82 0,74 0,78 0,82
Time specific 
effects
15,39 5,09 3456,59 15,77 5,89E+08 2022,31
Prob>F 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00  15




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Euromed -0,07 0,26 1,19*** 1,11*** _ _
Euromed(-2) _ -0,12 _ 0,20 _ _ 0,97*** 0,77**
Euromed13 _ -0,11 _ 0,25 _ _ 1,06*** 1,10**
Euromed>=4 _ -0,07 _ 0,38* _ _ 1,79*** 1,62***
Ln(PIB/hab) _ _ _ _ 1,14** _ 1,07**
%fuel exports _ _ _ _ 0,01 _ 0,01
Trade openness _ _ _ _ 0,00 _ 0,00
Y*CONST YES YES YES YES NO YES NO YES
Number observations 1994 1994 1994 1994 1994 1128 1994 1128
R² 0,69 0,69 0,76 0,76 0,71 0,83 0,72 0,83
Time specific effects 7,44 1,66E+11 2,76 3,11 15,05 12761,72 15,36 20400,75
Prob>F 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00  16
Concluding remarks
 A strong positive effect on the quality of the 
judicial system;
 The impact on the overall governance is less 
clear-cut; 
 No effect on the respect of democratic 
principles;
 Several reasons can explain this lack of results:
 EU-MED agreements are still recent
 the threat of sanctions by the EU is not credible
 the weakness of the resources dedicated to democratization
 Our analysis must be extended to all Trade 
Agreements the European Community has 
ratified. 